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Abstract-The purpose of this paper is to document the 
modeling considerations and performance metrics that were 
examined in the development of a large-scale Fault 
Detection, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR) system. The 
FDIR system is envisioned to perform health management 
functions for both a launch vehicle and the ground systems 
that support the vehicle during checkout and launch 
countdown by using a suite of complimentary software tools 
that alert operators to anomalies and failures in real-time. 
The FDIR team members developed a set of operational 
requirements for the models that would be used for fault 
isolation and worked closely with the vendor of the software 
tools selected for fault isolation to ensure that the software 
was able to meet the requirements. Once the requirements 
were established, example models of sufficient complexity 
were used to test the performance of the software. 
The results of the performance testing demonstrated the 
need for enhancements to the software in order to meet the 
demands of the full-scale ground and vehicle FDIR system. 
The paper highlights the importance of the development of 
operational requirements and preliminary performance 
testing as a strategy for identifying deficiencies in highly 
scalable systems and rectifying those deficiencies before 
they imperil the success of the project. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) 
encompasses the design, tools, strategies, devices and 
algorithms that are employed to improve safety, reduce 
costs, and increase reliability and availability of a system. 
At its core, ISHM provides some measure of health of a 
system that allows maintenance and operations to be 
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performed on a conditional basis to ensure the system will 
continue to operate safely and reliably within a given 
confidence interval. 
One significant aspect of ISHM is the capability to detect 
failure conditions in the system and isolate the failure to its 
root cause. Fault detection methods are wide-ranging and 
include a range of strategies from simple limit checking of 
measurements to data mining and statistical analysis to 
intelligent devices and built-in tests that identify failures at 
the source. Once a fault or off-nominal behavior is detected, 
fault isolation techniques are employed to locate the failure 
mode or modes of the system and implicate bad or suspected 
components for further testing and replacement. 
The Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR) project 
funded by NASA's Exploration Technology Development 
Program (ETDP) is purposed to mature fault detection, fault 
isolation, anomaly detection, and prognostics technologies 
for use in the new Constellation Program and future extra-
planetary missions. FDIR is intended and designed to be 
integrated with Ground Operations to automate fault 
detection and isolation during maintenance and checkout as 
well as launch countdown activities of ground and launch 
vehicle systems. The FDIR architecture supports the 
integration of several ISHM capabilities, but this paper will 
focus on the fault isolation feature. 
Model Selection 
Automated fault isolation requires the operational behavior 
of the system and its components to be defined so that it can 
be compared to the real-time system operation. The 
operational behavior is best captured in a model, and the 
type of model that is selected will be dependent on the 
application, resources and computing platform for the ISHM 
system. 
For the FDIR project, several model-based diagnostic 
approaches were considered before the functional fault 
model (FFM) was chosen to represent the ground and launch 
vehicle systems. A physics-based model by which live data 
can be compared to theoretical values is the most accurate 
approach to detecting failures of the system, but the 
complexity of the ground and vehicle systems in all of their 
potential configurations and mission phases would make the 
physics model difficult to verify by subject matter experts. 
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If the modeled systems had archives of historical data, the 
physics model could be compared to past. operational 
behavior, but the Constellation ground and vehicle systems 
have yet to be built or operated. Therefore, the physics-
based model was not chosen due to the lack of verification 
methods. Another candidate model was a rule-based expert 
system. The intent of the models is to aid engineer~ ~nd 
operators who are monitoring the systems by provldmg 
information about the health of the components and the 
entire system. An expert system would be able to determine 
the state of the components and system in a reliable, 
repeatable manner assuming that its knowledgebase was 
comparable to that of the engineer or operator. However, 
the process of translating the engineer's exp~rtiseI in~o a 
model requires a significant amount of the engmeer s time. 
Since the modeling effort was meant to be carried out by a 
group of non-subject matter experts, the rule-based expert 
system modeling approach was discarded. 
The FFM was selected because it allowed the modeling team 
to review system design documentation independently from 
the operators and engineers, create a model that resembles 
the schematic diagrams that are familiar to the experts, and 
have the experts verify the model without a large time 
commitment. Functional fault modeling involves capturing 
failure modes that have been identified both at design time 
and operationally. The Failure Mode Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) provides design-time failure modes, and problem 
reporting and corrective action databases and manufacturer 
datasheets provide insight into operational failures that are 
likely to occur or have been encountered for similar 
components in system. Once the failure modes have been 
catalogued, they can be placed in a model that maps the 
effects of the failures on system operation. Essentially, a 
FFM is responsible for identifying the failure effect 
propagation paths (FEPPs) from a failure mode .to the 
observation point where it is detected. The FFM IS then 
used in real-time to infer which failure modes or failed 
components could cause the observed behavior of the 
system. 
Although the FFM has many advantages, one weakness of 
the technique is that the FFM only captures known failures. 
In order to supplement the functional fault model, the FDIR 
architecture also includes a data-driven model that detects 
anomalies. The data-driven model was trained on data from 
similar ground and vehicle systems to create a 
knowledgebase of in-family behavior. After sufficient 
training on nominal data, the data-driven model provides a 
. measure of how closely the data it is monitoring matches the 
training data. The data-driven model is not able to use 
anomalous scores to isolate to a suspect component or 
system, but it does provide information about which 
measurements are contributing the most to the anomalous 
scores so that an operator or engineer can be alerted to a 
potential problem. The data-driven and functional fault 
models are complementary technologies that cover both 
known and unknown conditions of the system. 
2 
Testability Engineering And Maintenance System (TEAMS) 
A trade study evaluating current functional fault modeling 
software was executed by the FDIR project. The trade study 
involved a survey of papers on state-of-the-art model based 
diagnostic, including [References]. The outcome of the 
FDIR trade study was a recommendation to use Qualtech 
Systems Incorporated's (QSI's) Testability bngin~ring And 
Maintenance System (TEAMS) software sUite. The 
TEAMS software products include TEAMS Designer, 
TEAMS-RT and TEAMS Remote Diagnostic Server (RDS). 
TEAMS Designer is the user interface for building and 
analyzing the FFMs. It provides a graphical en.viron~ent 
where the system's failure modes, components, hierarchical 
structure, interconnections, and observation points are 
captured in block diagrams that closely resemble system 
schematics. TEAMS-RT is the software engine that 
interprets a set of pass or fail results at the observation 
points to determine whether the failure modes and 
components in the model are good, bad, suspect or 
unknown. TEAMS RDS is a server application which 
provides session management and archival services for o~e 
or more instances ofTEAMS-RT. Although TEAMS-RT IS 
a standalone product, a customer may opt to use TEAMS 
RDS for its management features in lieu of writing custom 
software that performs the same functions. The TEAMS 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products have more 
capability than FFM creation and real-time fault isolation, 
but the tool was chosen for the FDIR project specifically for 
those functions. 
After a model is created in TEAMS Designer, the model 
information is exported in the form of a dependency matrix 
(D-Matrix). The D-Matrix contains rows of failure modes 
and columns of observation points, or test points. If a 
particular failure mode is detectable by a test point, a one is 
placed in the D-Matrix at the intersection of the f~iNure mode 
and test point. A model will export one D-Matrlx for each 
system mode or configuration that is identified by the 
modeler. The system modes are defined by unique 
combinations of switches in the model that enable or disrupt 
theFEPPs. 
Once the D-Matrices have been defined, the TEAMS-RT 
engine uses them to isolate faults to a failure mode or modes 
based on the pass or fail state of the test points. The 
TEAMS-RT engine outputs lists of failure modes that are 
"bad", "suspect" and "unknown", and all other failure modes 
are assumed "good." A failure mode which is "good," or 
not failed, is one which is mapped to any test point with a 
pass result. A "bad" failure mode is one which ha~ a ~mm 
to a test point with a failed result, where the test pomt IS not 
mapped to any other failure modes besides failure modes 
that have already been determined to be "good." A 
"suspect" failure mode is one which has a FEPP to a test 
point with a failed result and the failure mode is not the only 
failure mode mapped to that test point. "Suspect" failure 
modes are by definition an ambiguity group for a single test 
point. Finally, "unknown" failure modes are those failure 
modes whose FEPPs map only to test points for which there 
are no pass or fail results. 
Since the model includes hierarchy information that relates a 
failure mode to a component or other higher level (such as a: 
line replaceable unit or subsystem), the same D-Matrix can 
be used to diagnose the system at different levels of 
resolution depending on the needs of the application. 
2. FDIR OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
The COTS TEAMS products were required to meet the 
operating criteria of other software tools selected for the 
FDIR application as well as customer requirements for the 
functionality of the fault isolation features. These 
. requirements include: 
(1) Model shall have clear mapping back to physical 
system to aid in initial model validation by system 
experts and maintainability and sustainability by 
system design engineers 
(2) The model shall be capable of isolating to multiple 
levels of resolution for the vehicle and ground systems 
(i.e. failure mode, component, line replaceable unit, 
etc.). 
(3) Modeling techniques and practices shall be scalable for 
a large, integrated model that encompasses vehicle 
systems, ground systems, and facility infrastructure. 
The integrated model will have an estimated 40,000 
failure modes and 50,000 test points if it includes the 
ground systems, launch vehicle and Orion capsule. 
(4) The model shall perform real-time fault isolation 
(TEAMS-RT will return a diagnosis with unknown, 
good, suspect and bad lists) within 1 second offault 
detection (pass/fail of tests). The model shall perform 
an update of the health status within one second of 
being passed the pass/fail test results. 
(5) The model shall be re-configurable on-the-fly to 
accommodate different mission phases, system modes, 
or vehicle configurations. The re-configuration of the 
large, integrated model shall not exceed the 
performance requirement of < 1 second to fault 
isolation 
(6) The real-time fault isolation tools shall be certified in 
accordance with GOP507007 Ground Element 
Command, Control and Communication Software 
Development Plan. Ground Operations will have to 
recommend which parts of GOP507007 apply to the 
tools and how the tools will be certified. 
3 
Scalability Questions 
The operational requirements raise two important questions 
which the FDIR project sought to answer before TEAMS 
was used to model a large, integrated system. The answer to 
these questions must be answered with both in mind. 
( 1) What model integration strategy should be employed 
for a large, integrated ground and vehicle system? 
(2) What configuration of TEAMS tools should be used to 
accommodate the model integration strategy? 
3. MODEL INTEGRATION STRATEGIES 
Several integration strategy options were considered for 
integrating Ares and Ground Operations FFMs into a 
solution that would support FDIR operations for combined 
Flight and Ground operations. 
At the turnover of the Ares vehicle to Kennedy Space Center 
(KSC) in Florida, there will be three data products provided 
to FDIR, as shown in the diagram below. 
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Figure 1 - Ares Vehicle Data Products 
As the note above states, once any of these data products are 
modified then that data product is no longer in 
configuration. The Verification and Validation (V&V) of 
that product no longer is applicable once this occurs. 
The first integration strategy option is shown below and 
consists of utilizing the single Ares FFM provided at 
turnover, along with a single Ground Operations FFM. A 
high level model Interface Control Document (ICD) would 
be maintained in order to ensure compatibility and 
integration between the two FFMs. 
Ares Ground 
Operations Model 
Model 
Figure 2 Model Integration Strategy #1 
Ares Ground Operations Model 
Model 
Figure 3 - Model Integration Strategy #2 
In order to increase the performance of option #1, 
integration strategy option #2 shown above was instituted. 
This option isolates the Ares model and Ground Operations 
model into separate reasoners, thereby reducing the load on 
a single reasoner. 
In the case where option #2 does not provide enough 
performance then the Ground Operations Functional Fault 
Model may be separated into sub-models. This is shown 
below as Integration Strategy Option #3. 
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Figure 4 - Model Integration Strategy #3 
In the case where option #3 does not provide enough 
performance, integration strategy option #4 was devised for 
ultimate performance. It does this by breaking both the 
Ground Operations FFM into sub-models as well as the Ares 
FFM into sub-models. While this does provide performance 
via "distributed computing" (each sub-model in its own 
reasoner), there are several disadvantages to this option. 
One of the most significant drawbacks is the fact that the 
integrity of the Ares FFM is violated and therefore is no 
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longer in a certified V & V configuration. These four 
integration strategy options were identified as being worthy 
for further examination. Each of these integration strategy 
options has advantages and disadvantages that deal with 
performance, model ICOs, and the number of reasoners that 
will be required. 
Modellnteiface Control Documents 
4. MODEL REAL-TIME PERFORMANCE 
After the model integration strategies were identified, the 
next issue to be resolved was whether or not it is feasible to 
place the Ares and ground models into a single large model 
due to performance constraints in TEAMS-RT. As 
previously stated, the estimated worst-case size of the 0-
Matrix is 40,000 failure modes by SO,OOO test points with 
SOO system modes. The main performance constraint is the 
operational requirement that TEAMS-RT would need to 
return a diagnosis of bad, suspect and unknown failure 
modes in less than one second from the time that the pass 
and fail test results were received by TEAMS-RT. 
Although performance is known to be better while running 
multiple TEAMS-RT reasoners independently, the FDIR 
project intends to use the TEAMS RDS management and 
archival services for its implementation so TEAMS RDS 
was allowed to manage mUltiple instances of TEAMS-RT 
during the performance benchmarking. Although the FDIR 
project is expecting to run TEAMS RDS on an AIX server, 
a Linux machine was used for the benchmarking because 
TEAMS RDS has not yet been ported to the AIX platform. 
The Linux machine has less power than the AIX server, so 
any results would collected would be worst case.. The 
performance testing was completed on a Dell Desktop with 
the following specs: 
(I) 2 Quad Core Xeon Proc ES420, 2.S0GHz, 2X6MB L2 
Cache, 1333 MHz Processors 
(2) 4GB, DDR2 ECC SDRAM Memory 667MHz, 4XIGB 
System Memory 
(3) 80GB SATA 3.0Gb/s, 7200RPM HardDrive with 8MB 
DataBurst Cache 
(4) Red Hat Linux OS 
The models used for the performance benchmarking were 
required to be as realistic as possible to validate the 
performance metrics. O-Matrix size, density and subsystem 
coupling all have effects on the performance of the TEAMS-
RT engine. Interactions between subsystems in a model 
affect the density off-diagonal regions of the D-Matrix. 
These interactions represent the propagation of failure 
modes from one subsystem to another. When two models 
share FEPPs, the resultant D-Matrix will have cells 
populated in regions A-B and B-A as shown in the figure 
below. If the two models are completely independent, no 
l's will appear in the A-B and B-A regions. 
Model A 8-A Interactions 
D-Matrix 
A-8 Interactions Model 8 
D-Matrix 
Figure 5 - Integrated Model D-Matrix 
In· order to simulate models with appropriate densities and 
cross-subsystem interactions, the large models used in the 
performance benchmarking were created by copying two 
ground and Ares vehicle models from a previous prototype 
multiple times and linking them together to simulate the 
cross-coupling between subsystems. 
The TEAMS RDS CPU usage was monitored for four 
different model sizes: approximately 1,000 failure modes, 
5,000 failure modes, 10,000 failure modes and 35,000 
failure modes. Detailed specifications for each of the four 
models follow: 
1000 failure modes 
RUNTIME_INPUT_OAT A 
TEAMS_RT _ VERSION 11.00 
NUM_ASPECT _ROWS 785 
NUM_SWITCH_ROWS 108 
NUM_AND_ROWS 0 
NUM_ACTUAL_TESTS348 
NUM_TEST_COLUMNS 348 
NUM_SWITCH_COLUMNS 138 
5000 failure modes 
RUNTIME_INPUT _OAT A 
TEAMS_RT _ VERSION 11.00 
NUM_ASPECT _ROWS 5495 
NUM_SWITCH_ROWS 756 
NUM_AND_ROWS 0 
NUM_ACTUAL_TESTS 2436 
NUM_ TEST_COLUMNS 2436 
NUM_SWITCH_COLUMNS 966 
10000 failure modes 
RUNTIME_INPUT _DATA 
TEAMS_RT _ VERSION 11.00 
NUM_ASPECT_ROWS 10990 
NUM_SWITCH_ROWS 1512 
NUM_AND_ROWS 0 
NUM_ACTUAL_ TESTS 4872 
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NUM_TEST _COLUMNS 4872 
NUM_SWITCH_COLUMNS 1932 
35000 failure modes 
RUNTIME_INPUT_DATA 
TEAMS_RT_ VERSION 11.00 
NUM_ASPECT _ROWS 38465 
NUM_SWITCH_ROWS 5292 
NUM_AND_ROWS 0 
NUM_ACTUAL_TESTS 17052 
NUM_TEST_COLUMNS 17052 
NUM_SWITCH_COLUMNS 6762 
Performance testing for a model with 50000 failure modes 
was attempted, but the model size reached the limit for a 32-
bit machine on the size of the D-Matrix and TEAMS 
Designer was unable to export the model files required for 
use by TEAMS-RT. If the integrated Ground Operations 
and Vehicle models are expected to be > 35000 failure 
modes, then QSI will need to implement a 64-bit version of 
TEAMS to support the large integrated models. 
For the 1,000 failure mode model, CPU utilization on the 
Linux server for any of the processes was negligible. The 
5,000 failure mode model typically had less than 2% CPU 
(single core) utilization for any realistic fault scenario and 
up to 4% CPU utilization for mySQL. By simulating a 
catastrophic failure with 1553 failures we were able to take 
CPU utilization for the reasoner increase to 15%. 
When operating the 10,000 failure mode model with 
realistic faults «100 faults at a given time), CPU usage 
showed typical values from 5-6%. The catastrophic failure 
scenario increased CPU utilization to a peak of 72%. 
System Mode changes for this model and the smaller models 
were all performed in less than 1 second. 
The 35,000 failure mode model performed similarly to the 
10,000 failure mode model with 5-6% CPU utilization for 
realistic faults. The catastrophic failure scenario increased 
response time to around 5 seconds and CPU (single core) 
utilization to 100%. The most significant performance delta 
occurred with system mode changes. The 35,000 failure 
mode model has 4,018 switches in it and any system mode 
change alters the state of approximately half of these. When 
system mode changes occur CPU utilization goes to 100% 
for nearly 60 seconds. Switching a more realistic 100 
switches is accomplished in less than 15 seconds and 300 
switches in less than 30 seconds. 
As stated previously, the 50K matrix was not tested due to 
32-bit OS limitations. 
In addition to measuring CPU utilization by TEAMS RDS 
for individual models, we ran three 10,000 failure mode 
models and a 35,000 failure mode model simultaneously as 
four instances of TEAMS-RT in TEAMS RDS. As 
expected, each instance of TEAMS-RT was constrained to a 
single core and the results were consistent with the 
previously obtained performance numbers. 
5. MODEL VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION 
The FDIR software will be utilized within the Launch 
Control System (LCS) of Ground Operations, and therefore 
must meet the LCS requirements for COTS software. The 
LCS requirements are: 
(1) The COTS must be developed by an organization with 
software CMM Maturity Level 3 or higher. 
(2) The COTS must be developed by an organization with 
a CMMI SEISW Capability Level 2 or higher as 
measured by an SEI authorized lead appraiser form an 
external organization in the following areas: 
a. Requirements Management 
b. Configuration Management 
c. Process and Product Quality Assurance 
d. Measurement and Analysis 
e. Project Planning 
f. Project Monitoring and Control 
g. Supplier Agreement Management 
(3) In the event that number one or two above cannot be 
satisfied by the organization that developed the COTS, 
the alternative is to provide, as a minimum, the 
following documentation to NASA. NASA will then 
determine whether the processes utilized in creating the 
software allow the software to be utilized in a safety 
critical system. 
a. Product Software Design and 
Implementation 
b. Software Management Processes 
I. Configuration Management 
ii. Verification and Validation 
iii. Software Testing 
c. Testing 
I. Acceptance Test Plan 
ii. Test Results (both current and 
subsequent releases) 
iii. Test Procedures 
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d. Defect Tracking Process 
e. Defect History (both current and 
subsequent releases) 
While QSI does not have CMM or CMMI certification, they 
do have processes in place that are ISO certified. 
Continuing ISO audits ensure that they are following their 
documented processes. The ISO certification does not meet 
the requirements as outlined above; however by examining 
the ISO controlled processes involving components 
described in (3) above for suitability in the areas outlined in 
(2), one can determine the suitability of utilizing the COTS 
software. QSI's processes were examined with this in mind. 
QSI's primary processes utilize Mantis, CVS, and 
electronically controlled documentation. The initial 
examination proved successful and no deficient areas were 
identified. In addition, QSI provided electronic copies of all 
areas that were examined. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The performance benchmarking numbers prove that any of 
the four model integration strategies would be feasible for 
the FDIR project as long as QSI is able to provide a 64-bit 
implementation of TEAMS-RT and TEAMS RDS. In the 
absence of a 64-bit implementation, two instances of 
TEAMS-RT would have to be instituted in TEAMS RDS-
one for the ground system models and one for the Ares 
vehicle model. However, it is more favorable to work with 
QSI to implement 64-bit TEAMS in order to maintain the 
cross-coupling between ground and vehicle models without 
custom external code. As for real-time performance, the 
benchmarking confirms the ability of a Linux computer 
running TEAMS RDS to return fault isolation diagnoses 
within the one second time frame and with reasonable CPU 
usage within the constraints of the operational requirements. 
The paper highlights the importance of the development of 
operational requirements and preliminary performance 
testing as a strategy for identifying deficiencies in highly 
scalable systems and rectifying those deficiencies before 
widespread model building begins. Discovering scalability 
problems early in the design cycle and establishing modeling 
methods to avert or alleviate their impact are vital to the 
success of any sizeable modeling undertaking. 
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